What Is the Purpose of Blocking Access to Internet Content?

A. The Purpose Elucidated in This Article Is Applicable to Democratic Constitutional States

I advise the reader to review this article on the premise of the condition in an "ideal" democratic constitutional state (Rechtsstaat). Indeed, access-blocking methodologies are deployed globally, and in a portion of these jurisdictions, the primary objectives pursued through access-blocking may diverge substantially from those in the rest of the world.

For instance, North Korea maintains a network infrastructure designated as Kwangmyong. This infrastructure operates as a perimeter firewall severing North Korea's WAN backbone from the global internet, permitting only a strictly authorized, minute segment to route outbound traffic through North Korean infrastructure onto the global internet backbone. Thus, it may be stated that a national intranet exists in North Korea, with the global internet being subjected to total access-blocking. Similarly, China deploys a sophisticated firewall infrastructure designated as the Great Firewall of China, equipped with advanced Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and derivative oversight controls. While this control system on China's network backbone does not entirely sever outbound access to the global network as in North Korea, numerous global internet environments—such as search engines or social media platforms—remain inaccessible from within China, with domestic tech giants such as Baidu operating as localized alternatives.

As illustrated in the aforementioned examples of North Korea or China, in analogous legal systems, the vast majority of websites and applications are directly blocked from access without requiring an individualized judicial order, as sanctioned by their legal frameworks. Although a comprehensive analysis within the framework of communist doctrine would be warranted, the fundamental purpose in such legal systems—pursuant to their underlying legal philosophy—is the direct prevention of any potential outcome contrary to that philosophy, ensuring that internet or intranet usage is permitted solely within the parameters endorsed by the regime's legal philosophy.

Conversely, in democratic constitutional states prioritizing liberal philosophy, the objective similarly pertains to utilizing the internet environment as authorized by the legal framework. However, in such legal systems, the objective is not to execute blanket access-blocking against internet environments controlled by Google and other foreign ISPs to preemptively neutralize all potential risks in toto; rather, access-blocking measures are applied ex post facto once an outcome violating the legal framework has materialized, or ex ante where such an outcome is highly imminent. The explanations below are applicable to legal systems of this nature, including our domestic jurisdiction.

B. The Purpose of Access-Blocking: Minimizing Harm Until Content Removal

As is well known to virtually anyone acquainted with internet usage, the outcome achieved through access-blocking can easily be neutralized via various circumvention methodologies. Therefore, access-blocking can never constitute the primary instrument directed toward an ideal legal outcome. When this measure is applied, content restricted from access via domestic infrastructure remains easily accessible within Türkiye through circumvention tools, while clients abroad retain direct, unhindered access to such content.

Regarding access-blocking, alternative mechanisms exist to alleviate the technical burden imposed upon access provider ISPs. For instance, in environments where ISPs operating websites work in integration with legal systems, it is possible for the ISP to block content against traffic originating from specific jurisdictions or multiple countries. Thus, legal frameworks or state authorities transmit access-blocking orders to ISPs, enabling platforms such as YouTube to directly block a video against traffic originating from all European jurisdictions. However, even though circumvention tools may prove somewhat more onerous under such conditions, bypassing these blocks remains far from difficult even for ordinary internet users.

This is precisely why, upon the existence of an internet content deemed undesirable—whether owing to statutory unlawfulness or other grounds—the primary affirmative action required is to permanently remove the content. The ultimate conclusion emerging from these observations is that, irrespective of the underlying rationale, the core purpose of access-blocking is to minimize harm until the undesirable state of affairs is terminated through content removal.

B.1. Why Is Access-Blocking Necessary to Minimize Harm?

First and foremost, it must be stated that asserting from a purely hacktivist or anarchic perspective that "the internet constitutes an unregulable, infinitely free environment" does not represent a reasonable claim in today's world. (Decades ago, before the internet had become deeply embedded within the social order and when the concept of hacking bore no negative connotation, sound-minded individuals holding such views did exist. However, that era of "well-intentioned hacking" has receded; well-intentioned hackers have become a minority, giving way to a hacking landscape dominated by criminal enterprises. If there remain individuals today who maintain that the internet ought to remain entirely unregulated, I invite them to reconsider after placing themselves in the position of a victim. I am certain that even a black-hat hacker, upon suffering a similar plight, would expect the legal system to vindicate their rights...)

In the modern era, individuals are afforded the "right to be forgotten" even with respect to lawful content, and internet content harboring no statutory unlawfulness may be ordered removed by judicial decisions to safeguard human dignity. Therefore, asserting that content verified as unlawful through an administrative or judicial determination must be removed constitutes nothing beyond stating an obvious legal reality.

As noted supra, access-blocking is executed to prevent the escalation of harm pending content removal. We now turn to the nature of this "harm harboring the potential to compound." In scenarios involving defamation, unlawful online publication of mobile phone numbers or other personal data, or illicitly obtained intimate media, variations in the severity of harm may exist across these acts. Nevertheless, it is obvious that in all such instances, some degree of harm will accrue to the victim (conceptually designated as an infringement of personal rights).

Now, let us hypothesize that the plain-text password database of an e-commerce platform (unprotected by hashing or salting) is projected onto a large screen in the middle of Taksim Square. Law enforcement would undoubtedly intervene immediately to terminate the projection, or failing direct access to the projector, adopt measures to prevent the public from viewing the exposure pending the termination of the broadcast. Let us transpose this example to an internet forum, assuming the identical database is published on a publicly accessible forum. The risk of harm in the online environment would exponentially exceed the risk in Taksim Square. This is because millions of individuals across various global locations can access, record, and repeatedly redistribute online publications within seconds. Because the servers hosting these publications and the users accessing them are dispersed worldwide, halting the dissemination is far less straightforward than in Taksim Square. The sole catalyst for the "compounding potential" of any harm online resides in these immutable realities of the internet's nature. Consequently, pursuant to this risk of harm harboring the potential for rapid escalation, such content must be blocked from access until it is somehow removed (an outcome that is frequently difficult to achieve).

C. Access-Blocking Measures Constitute Interlocutory Injunctions, Not Sanctions, and Persist Only Pending Content Removal

Excepting those directed at intellectual property infringements, access-blocking measures in certain jurisdictions are not anchored in detailed statutory enactments, but are executed via administrative blacklisting practices. In contrast to this prevailing state across many European nations, detailed statutory frameworks governing access-blocking exist in jurisdictions such as Türkiye, Germany, the United States, and Russia. What remains paramount, regardless of whether explicit access-blocking legislation exists, is the foundational principle of law—dominant within global legal taxonomy—that access-blocking must be restricted exclusively to the specific unlawful content rather than the entire website, where technically feasible (designated as URL-based blocking).

If an access-blocking order is rendered resulting in the blocking of solely the unlawful internet content (for instance, a single video), the order need not be formally re-evaluated once that specific video is subsequently removed. However, where the subject content cannot be blocked as a standalone element, resulting in the blocking of the entire website or application (blocking an entire domain requires less sophisticated technology and is technically simpler), the access-blocking order must be re-examined upon the subsequent removal of the unlawful content. This is because a website no longer hosting unlawful content would otherwise remain entirely blocked without legal justification. Owing to this necessity, access-blocking orders operate strictly as interlocutory measures applied to prevent the compounding of harm pending content removal, and upon the cessation of the harm or content, the measure must be terminated ipso jure. (The termination of the measure, self-evidently, manifests as the unblocking of access to the entire website or application.)

D. Conformity of the Domestic Legal Infrastructure in Türkiye with This Purpose

In Law No. 5651—one of the two primary statutes governing internet regulation alongside the Electronic Communications Law—as well as numerous derivative statutes, regulations, and normative instruments cross-referencing it, it is explicitly codified that access-blocking constitutes an interlocutory measure that persists solely pending content removal. Consequently, within Turkish internet law, no conceptual conflict of "means and ends" exists regarding administrative orders or determinations rendered by Peace Judgeships of Criminal Matters.

In civil litigation, however, the situation diverges somewhat. If a litigant institutes a civil action before the Civil Court of First Instance requesting an access-blocking order against specific content, and the claim is granted, a final judgment on the merits ordering access-blocking will materialize. Because the trial judge cannot subsequently modify the terms of a final judgment, nor issue a conditional decree stating "access-blocking shall automatically lapse upon content removal," a scenario wherein an entire website is blocked pursuant to a civil judgment will not automatically lapse even if the website subsequently achieves full legal compliance. Consequently, interested parties may face the procedural burden of lodging subsequent applications or instituting supplementary civil actions seeking the dissolution of the access-blocking order.

Atty. Alp Öztekin, LL.M.