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Blocking Access to and Removal of Internet Content in Cases of Violation of the Right to Respect for Private Life (In Türkiye)
A) The Scope of the Sphere of Private Life in the Internet Environment
The concept of the sphere of private life initially characterizes a person's life known only to themselves or to specific individuals with their own authorization. However, this concept does not merely encompass a life lived behind closed doors within a home or a room. Consequently, as the Court of Cassation elucidated, "The concept of private life is not composed solely of a person's life and privacy behind closed doors, within four walls, and out of sight, unshared with others; rather, it extends to the entirety of purely personal life events and information that are not known or ought not to be known by everyone, which can be disclosed to third parties upon request,"[1] thereby allowing the boundaries of this concept to expand considerably.
It should be noted that the scope of protection afforded to the right to privacy is narrower for public figures, such as celebrities or politicians. Thus, in matters concerning the public interest, a paramount public interest may override the right to respect for private life.[2] However, even in such contexts, if there is no public interest in the disclosure of internet content pertaining to the private sphere of public figures, it is clear that the right to privacy will have been violated.[3]
A violation of the right to respect for private life may emanate from social media content as well as news coverage. It may manifest as pornographic content[4] or arise from the publication—and subsequent non-deletion—of a photograph depicting a private moment on social media. In an illustrative case, where a photograph depicting a private moment was shared with mutual consent on a non-public social media account, and subsequently retained despite the deterioration of the parties' relationship and the explicit request of one party for its deletion, the court adjudicated that the continued publication violated the right to respect for private life.[5]
B) Recourse to the Cybersecurity Presidency and the Process Before the Peace Judgeship of Criminal Matters for Access-Blocking
Article 9/A of Law No. 5651 introduced a direct application mechanism to the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) as an expedited remedy for victims in violations of privacy. Subsequently, the authority receiving these applications was reconstituted in 2026 as the Cybersecurity Presidency (SGB). The operational dilemma resides in the fact that the statute solely regulates the blocking of access; it fails to encompass orders for the removal of content, which constitutes the definitive remedy when URL-based access-blocking cannot be effectively implemented[6] or when blocking measures are circumvented via virtual private networks (VPNs) or analogous mechanisms.
When the BTK held jurisdiction, applications were submitted via the E-Devlet portal. The existing portal remains operational and continues to process applications. These submissions may be forwarded to the SGB. Furthermore, the SGB maintains a dedicated reporting service at '
Upon examining an application and issuing an administrative determination to grant relief, the President of the SGB notifies the Access Providers Association (ESB) to execute the determination and block access to the content. In my view, administrative law remedies may be invoked against such administrative determinations before the administrative judiciary. (Under general principles of administrative acts, the determination constitutes an enforceable and independent administrative act. The ESB is legally bound to execute access-blocking directly pursuant to the President's order. The implementation of the President's determination is not contingent upon any supplementary approval or administrative signature. Secondly, pursuant to Article 125 of the Constitution, administrative acts cannot be excluded from judicial review except through explicit constitutional exceptions.)
Within 24 hours of applying to the SGB, victims must submit the identical application to the Peace Judgeship of Criminal Matters. The judgeship evaluates the application to determine whether a violation of the right to privacy has occurred and transmits its judicial determination directly to the SGB. In the event of a failure to submit the application or upon the issuance of an adverse judicial ruling, the administrative blocking order issued by the President automatically lapses ipso jure. As explicitly mandated by statute, interlocutory appeals (itiraz) against determinations of the Peace Judgeship of Criminal Matters may be lodged in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Paragraph 8 of Article 9/A of Law No. 5651 provides that in cases where "delay entails peril" (gecikmede sakınca), the President of the SGB may issue an access-blocking order directly—bypassing the ESB—and compel access providers to execute the measure. The inherent nature of the digital environment intrinsically embodies peril in delay. Consequently, it must be noted that this statutory mechanism is fraught with legal problems. The criteria governing the determination of peril in delay remain legally undefined. While a distinction between minor and severe violations might be attempted, even content that trivially infringes upon private life can reach hundreds of thousands of individuals within minutes and undergo repeated dissemination, thereby generating genuine peril in delay. Although the precise standard remains unclear, upon establishing peril in delay, the President issues a determination, which must be submitted directly for judicial approval to the Peace Judgeship of Criminal Matters within 24 hours.
It must be emphasized that in light of the reasoning of the Constitutional Court regarding the annulment of Article 9 of the Law, Article 9/A is demonstrably problematic under constitutional jurisprudence. First, the protective scope of this provision remains ambiguous. Although the title of Article 20 of the Constitution is "Privacy of Private Life," the constitutional amendment of 2010 incorporated the right to the protection of personal data into the same article. Article 9/A of Law No. 5651 employs exclusively the term "violation of the privacy of private life," rendering it questionable whether personal data falls within its statutory ambit. Pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution and the fundamental tenets of the rule of law, statutory provisions restricting fundamental rights must be strictly construed. Since personal data is not explicitly mentioned in the text of Article 9/A, it follows that the provision ought not to encompass personal data.
C) Application to the Civil Court of First Instance for Access-Blocking and Content Removal
Article 9/A of Law No. 5651 exclusively governs the blocking of access. Access-blocking measures, however, operate solely within the domain served by the local access provider and are easily circumvented via VPNs and similar tools, meaning they do not constitute a definitive remedy per se. To entirely prevent the infringement of rights and ensure the permanent deletion of content from the internet environment, civil actions protective of personal rights must be instituted before the Civil Court of First Instance pursuant to the provisions of the Turkish Civil Code. Therefore, in the first instance, an action for content removal must be brought before the Civil Court of First Instance in cases of privacy violations.
Secondly, where no practical relief is obtained through applications grounded in Law No. 5651, an action requesting an access-blocking injunction may also be initiated before the Civil Court of First Instance. Although jurisprudence exists asserting that civil courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over matters regulated under Law No. 5651,[7] the Constitutional Court has affirmed that, pursuant to the right to an adversarial trial—which constitutes an essential component of the right to a fair trial—litigants remain fully entitled to initiate civil actions requesting access-blocking injunctions before adversarial civil courts.[8]
Atty. Alp Öztekin, LL.M.
alpozztekin@gmail.com
[1] 12th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, E. 2013/14391, K. 2014/4498.
[2] ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany.
[3] 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, E. 2016/3324, K. 2018/274.
[4] 12th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, E. 2014/12673, K. 2015/4274.
[5] 12th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, E. 2017/150, K. 2017/6231.
[6] Paragraph 4 of Article 9/A of Law No. 5651 specifies that blocking measures may only be executed on a content/URL basis. Paradoxically, Paragraph 7 of the same provision dictates that if the content subject to access-blocking is removed, the access-blocking order lapses automatically. However, Paragraph 4 already mandates that blocking can only be executed on a URL basis; thus, upon removal of the content, no target URL address subject to access-blocking remains in existence.
[7] 19th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, E. 2017/3289, K. 2018/1063.
[8] Constitutional Court, Application of C.K., Application No: 2014/19685.
